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Abstract: Plato’s Republic, as the dialogue is known in 
English, is a classic, perhaps the classic investigation of 
the reasons why human beings form political communi-
ties —or “cities” in his terms.  In the Republic Socrates 
inquires into the origins of the city in order to discover 
what justice “writ big” is.  But in the process of construct-
ing his “city”—or, actually, “cities”—” in speech,” Socra-
tes does not offer us a definition of justice so much as he 
shows us the reasons why no actual city is ever apt to be 
perfectly just. From Plato’s Republic we thus understand 
why justice is difficult, if not impossible to achieve for 
communities, but may be a virtue of private individuals. 
 




 Plato’s Republic, as the dialogue is known in English, 
is a classic, perhaps the classic investigation of the rea-
sons why human beings form political communities--or 
“cities” in his terms.  In the Republic (368c-369a) Socra-
tes inquires into the origins of the city in order to discover 
what justice “writ big” is. However, in the process of con-
structing his “city in speech,” Socrates does not offer us a 
definition of justice so much as he shows us the reasons 
why no actual city is ever apt to be perfectly just. In other 
words, from Plato’s Republic we learn something about 
the limits of politics that make justice difficult, if not im-
possible to achieve for communities, if not for private in-
dividuals. 
 What we first learn from Socrates’ attempt to discover 
what justice is by looking for it “writ big” in a city is that, 
like the city itself, justice arises out of a certain kind of 
necessity.  The unstated implication is that justice is not 
desirable in itself. 
 Cities arise, Socrates points out (369b), because indi-
vidual human beings are not self-sufficient. Because eve-
ryone has more needs than he or she can easily supply for 
him or herself, people gather together. Instead of every-
one trying to fulfill his or her basic needs for food, cloth-
ing, and housing, people quickly learn that it works better 
for each to do what he or she does best and to trade their 
surplus with others. What Socrates calls the “true” and 
“healthy” city is thus characterized by a division of labor 
and specialization. And that division extends beyond the 
provision of what might be considered to be the most ba-
sic needs—food, clothing, and shelter--to the manufacture 
of tools, for example, plows for farming, as well to trade. 
It thus includes merchants, sailors, and money as well as 
wage-labor. (369c-371e) 
 The way in which this first “true” city embodies the 
principle of justice does not become clear until later, be-
cause when Socrates asks Adeimantus whether this first 
city is complete, and where justice and injustice are to be 
found in it, Adeimantus is not sure. But the simple life 
Socrates goes on to describe--of people making the food, 
clothing, and shelter they need, naked and shoeless in the 
summer, but clothed and housed in the winter, and with 
enough to relax, feast, and drink to the gods in the eve-
ning, as well as to have sweet intercourse with one an-
other—sounds almost idyllic (372a-c). It is a vision to 
which many subsequent thinkers have returned. It is, 
therefore, worth our while to look more carefully at what 
Socrates calls the true city. The principle of justice Socra-
tes and his interlocutors later find “rolling around at their 
feet” (432d-433a) turns out to be the organizing principle 
of the first, true city. It is the principle of the division of 
labor and specialization—namely, that each should do 
what he or she does best by nature and share or exchange 
the benefits.  
 Why is this the first and perhaps most fundamental 
rule of justice? There are two reasons, I would suggest. 
First, when each does what he or she does best by nature, 
and they share or exchange the fruits of their labor, eve-
ryone benefits. In other words, under this arrangement the 
good of the individual and the good of the community are 
the same. There is no question of someone taking advan-
tage of someone else by force or by fraud. However, the 
harmony of individual and social good in this simple city 
is not solely or automatically a product of the division of 
labor and specialization per se. In most actual divisions, 
the tasks and the rewards are not equal. Some people, 
usually poor and uneducated, are forced by economic ne-
cessity if not outright coercion to perform tasks that maim 
rather than fulfill them. Other people reap more of the 
benefits. For the division of labor to be just, Socrates thus 
insists that it be based upon differences in natural inclina-
tions or talents. Because each does what he or she is natu-
rally inclined to do, each presumably contributes his or 
her part spontaneously and voluntarily.  No one forces 
someone else to work; no one decides what other mem-
bers of the community must do. Everyone contributes his 
or her bit to the good of the community as a whole, and 
everyone enjoys the same benefits or rewards. That is 
possible, we soon learn, only when all members of the 
community restrict their desires and consumption to what 
they need. No luxury or surplus can be allowed. 
 Reflecting on the embodiment of what Socrates later 
identifies as the principle of justice in this first “true” city, 
we can already see three important elements, if not prob-
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lems. First, justice arises not as a matter of choice or 
something desirable so much as a necessity imposed by 
the limitations or weaknesses of individual human beings. 
Second, insofar as the justice of the division of labor rests 
on differences of natural talents, it rests on an abstract 
generalization.  As Socrates says, we observe that differ-
ent individuals perform various tasks more or less easily. 
It is not the case, however, that any individual human be-
ing is as uni-dimensional or single-talented as Socrates 
suggests. Some people can do many things well; others 
can perform few, if any tasks well. It is not possible, 
moreover, to see or know what any individual can do eas-
ily or well until he or she does it. Some tasks require great 
physical strength; others presuppose good memories or 
facility with words. The relevant differences in natural 
aptitude may be more visible in the simple city than they 
are in more complex economies and civilization. (No one 
can know until a person has been highly educated and 
trained whether she will become a great mathematician or 
pianist, for example.) But even in the simple city, aptitude 
per se is not visible; and individuals will, in fact, be able 
to do more than one thing. Nature does not provide as 
much direction as Socrates suggests. But where the allo-
cation of tasks is not based on natural differences, it is not 
clearly or unambiguously just.  
 Glaucon famously raises a third fundamental problem 
by declaring that the first “true” city is a “city of pigs” 
(372d).  Put simply, Glaucon’s point is that human beings 
are not satisfied merely with what they need to survive 
comfortably. We want more. We do not simply desire 
more basic goods to secure us against future wants; we 
desire services and goods that are not necessary for our 
self-preservation. We want luxuries like servants, artists, 
various kinds of adornment, entertainment, honors, and 
learning. (372e-373c) Arising more from our imagination 
and intellect than from simple need, these “luxuries” in-
clude activities like poetry that we often define as distinc-
tively human.  
 Socrates does not say whether he thinks such ever-
expanding human desire is natural.  But, by characterizing 
a city animated by desire for non-necessary goods as “fe-
verish” in contrast to the “healthy” city he first described, 
Socrates suggests that such a city is “sick” and thus in 
danger of disintegrating. He does not deny, however, that 
some, if not all human beings are moved by a desire to 
have more than they need merely to survive. Indeed, he 
points out that in this desire they have found the origin of 
both war and injustice. (373e) 
 Because human desires are not limited to the require-
ments of self-preservation, whether of the individual or of 
the species, as one might argue animals are instinctively 
regulated, more complex civic institutions become neces-
sary. So, Socrates observes, even if the citizens of a 
“healthy” city are satisfied with what they need, they will 
find themselves destroyed by others if they do not provide 
for the common defense. And, fighting wars successfully 
requires knowledge, skill, or art. Following the principle 
that each person should perform the task or art for which 
he or she is best suited by nature, Socrates and his inter-
locutors are thus led to ask, what sort of person is best 
able by nature to defend or guard the city? Just as we 
have seen that human desires in general are directed not 
merely to what is necessary for survival and so to a just 
division of labor, but also to what is not necessary and 
thus to the unjust seizure of the goods of others, so we 
now see that the defenders of cities need to have a double 
nature, characterized by what appear to be opposed incli-
nations.1 Simply stated, the guardians need to be gentle to 
their fellow citizens, but harsh toward enemies. Socrates 
thus admits, in effect, that human nature is not as uni-
dimensional or uni-directed, as his first true city presup-
posed. 
 Socrates also admits, in effect, that justice or order 
may spontaneously arise as a matter of necessity, but it 
cannot and will not be spontaneously or automatically 
maintained after the requirements of mere preservation 
are met. Human beings do not naturally live at peace with 
one another, because we are naturally drawn—both as in-
dividuals and in communities--in opposite directions.  
 The practical problem that arises as soon as we recog-
nize the need for some members of a community to be 
armed to defend the whole remains all-too-familiar. The 
arms that enable some members of the citizen body to de-
fend the rest can be used just as well—indeed, even more 
easily—to oppress the other members of their own com-
munity without arms. Military dictatorships and corrupt 
policemen are still all-too-common. (E.g., Syria or, per-
haps closer to home, the Mafia.) Like Socrates we thus 
have an immediate interest in asking how we can prevent 
the armed from oppressing their unarmed fellows. Like 
Socrates and his interlocutors, we also need to persuade 
both our military forces and the police not only to risk 
their lives in order to protect the lives of others but also to 
believe that it would be wrong for them to seize power as 
the reward they are due for protecting the rest of us. 
 To prevent those with arms from using them to op-
press the unarmed, Socrates suggests, it is necessary to 
regulate their education from birth. Because guardians 
will have to risk their lives in order to defend the city, 
they should also not be allowed to hear stories about the 
terrors of the afterlife that might make them afraid to die. 
Nor should they be presented with images of gods or he-
roes engaging in immoderate behavior—whether that be 
lamentations for the loss of a beloved son or friend, ex-
cessive eating and drinking, or even laughter. (386a-391e) 
 By forbidding the expression of a desire for anything 
more than people need in order to survive comfortably, 
Socrates’ second, defensive city might seem to have re-
turned, at least domestically, to his first “true” city, char-
acterized by free and equal economic exchange.  There is, 
however, a crucial difference between the first “true” and 
“healthy” city, in which people voluntarily supply and 
exchange the goods and services they need on the basis of 
their own various natural inclinations, and the second 
“purged” city (399e), in which the natural desire people 
have to do and possess more than what is necessary to 
preserve themselves has to be intentionally and repeatedly 
repressed. 
 The tension or gap between the good of the individual 
and the good of the community becomes evident—
especially when Socrates turns from the guardians’ educa-
tion in music to “gymnastics.” Although every citizen is 
supposed to do what he or she does best by nature, Socra-
tes points out, they will not be training and conditioning 
guardians to fight in defense of the city the way athletes 
are trained and conditioned for gymnastic contests, even 
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though such athletes would appear to be those best suited 
by nature to bodily exercises. In order to perform well in 
specific contests, Socrates reminds his interlocutors, ath-
letes have to follow a strict regimen of eating and sleep-
ing. But, in order to fight defensively, soldiers have to be 
conditioned to go without food or sleep. (404a-b) In Soc-
rates’ second, “purged city” it is no longer simply the citi-
zens’ natural inclinations or talents that determine what 
they do and learn, but their specific function in and for the 
city. Turning from the guardians’ formative gymnastic 
training to remedial care of their bodies or medicine, Soc-
rates thus enunciates a very harsh doctrine. In the purged 
city doctors will not be allowed to acquire as much 
knowledge as possible about ways of preserving life.  The 
goal of the purged city is no longer the preservation of 
individuals, as it was initially in the “true” city. The goal 
has become instead the preservation of the community. 
Individual human beings who are not able to perform 
their functions are to be left to die. (404e-408b) If justice 
is to be found in this second, “purged” city, it appears to 
consist in putting the interest of the community or the 
“common good” above that of the individual. Such a 
stance would seem to be characteristic of a soldier who 
risks his life in defending his city and family. But, we 
should ask, is this justice? And if it is, is justice a virtue 
that is choiceworthy in and of itself?  
 Liberals are apt to object to the obvious deprivation of 
freedom of thought and expression Socrates has mandated 
to “purge” his city.2 But, even if one takes the education 
Socrates proposes in its own terms, one can ask whether it 
is apt to produce the desired results. Will soldiers be truly 
courageous—or even disciplined, for that matter—if they 
do not fear death? Will people who have never been ex-
posed to excess or luxury be able to restrain their desires, 
if and when they have an opportunity to indulge them? 
Would human beings really want to live in a society 
where laughter is forbidden? 
 As Socrates makes clear in his description of the rude 
medicine they will allow in the city, the point of the edu-
cation of the guardians is not to make them knowledge-
able. It is rather to develop and harmonize both their 
harsh and gentle sides so that they can serve as guardians. 
And that means, primarily, that they must be inculcated 
with right opinions. Above all, Socrates emphasizes, 
guardians must be taught to love the city, because a per-
son will “surely love something most when he believes 
that the same things are advantageous to it and to him-
self” (412d). The second, “purged” city Socrates has 
sketched is not characterized by freedom of thought. Nor 
is it simply based on the truth. On the contrary, Socrates 
informs his interlocutors, instituting such a “just” city will 
require them to tell a “well-born lie” that has two parts: 
the citizens must all be persuaded, first, that they are all 
brothers and sisters, children of the land they occupy; and, 
second, that they are all born with different metallic 
bloods—gold, silver, iron, and bronze—that determine 
the specific functions they will perform in the city as rul-
ers, soldiers, farmers or mechanics.3 The need for such a 
lie points to the two ways in which no particular “city” or 
political community will ever be perfectly just: 1) no peo-
ple has an unambiguous right to occupy any particular 
part of the earth to the exclusion of all others; and 2) allo-
cations of necessary tasks in any community will never 
simply or completely correspond to the desires and incli-
nations of individuals.  
 The “justice” of Socrates’ second, “purged” city con-
sists in the complete subordination of the desires of the 
individual citizens to the needs of the community as a 
whole.  In order to achieve the common good, Socrates 
suggests, the community should be as unified as it can be. 
If it were possible, all citizens should feel the pain, if any 
one pricks her finger. (462b-d) No one should be aware of 
any difference that divides him or her from others. 
To achieve maximal unity, Socrates explains, it will not 
suffice to persuade citizens that they are all members of 
the same family and born to perform a certain function. 
The guardians—that is to say, those with the arms that 
would enable them to oppress their fellow citizens—must 
be deprived not merely of all private property, but of all 
privacy. They and their domiciles must always be open to 
public inspection. (416d) They must not be allowed to 
develop any private interests or affections that might 
qualify their complete dedication to the common good. 
 To make sure that all members of the community 
serve in the capacity for which they are best suited by na-
ture, Socrates adds, males and females must be given the 
same education—and subjected to the same tests to de-
termine who should learn and perform which of the nec-
essary tasks. (451d-452a) To free females from the bur-
dens of child-rearing as well as to prevent the develop-
ment of particular attachments that would compromise 
citizens’ whole-hearted dedication to the community, 
children must also be reared in common, without knowl-
edge of their parents or their parents knowing which chil-
dren are theirs. (457d-460d) 
 Socrates expects that there will be resistance to his 
proposals to abolish private property and households or 
families, as we know them. His suggestion that they de-
stroy what we now call the nuclear family has been de-
cried as “unnatural,” but Socrates suggests that common 
notions about gender roles or the division of labor be-
tween the sexes are highly conventional. (The Republic is 
a very radical book; there was nothing really like it again 
until the 19th century when some of the proposals Socrates 
makes for the sake of argument, were seriously proposed 
as actual reforms.) 
 Because the proposition that friends hold all things in 
common was an old adage (even in ancient Greece), Soc-
rates thinks that his third, most novel proposal will pro-
voke the most outrage and opposition. And, surely, his 
advocacy of “philosopher-kings” (or queens, according to 
the argument) has proved to be the single most distinctive 
and famous feature of the Republic.4 But, why, we should 
ask does Socrates insist that the rule of philosophers will 
be necessary to bring a truly just society into existence? 
Strictly speaking, he observes that the least change in any 
existing city that would be required to make it truly just 
would be for a ruler to become a philosopher, or a phi-
losopher to become a ruler. (473c-d) However, we still 
confront the question, why? At first it looks as if the phi-
losophers possess the knowledge required to found and 
maintain such a city. Specifically, they are said to know 
the forms of the virtues, i.e., what human excellence is, 
and how to foster it. (500c-501b) What that means, in ef-
fect, is that they know what human potential is-—both in 
general and in the case of specific individuals. Such phi-
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losophers would presumably be able to assign individual 
citizens the tasks for which they are best suited by nature, 
because these philosophers would know the nature of 
each as well as of the species as a whole. If human beings 
were programmed by nature to perform a specific task, as 
Socrates suggested in his initial description of the “true” 
city, it would be possible for a ruler to allocate tasks on 
the basis of his or her knowledge of nature. But, in fact, 
we know that human beings are not so clearly directed by 
nature or to a single task.  
 Not surprisingly, therefore, Socrates introduces an-
other reason why philosophers would make the only just 
rulers: philosophers are the only human beings who can-
not use rule to obtain what they most desire. (520d-521a)  
As lovers of wisdom, philosophers do not possess knowl-
edge so much as seek it.  And, Socrates argues, their 
overwhelming love of truth makes philosophers relatively 
immune to the fear of death and desires for wealth and 
reputation that lead other human beings to be unjust. 
(484d-486c) However, Socrates acknowledges, that very 
love of truth also makes philosophers not merely uninter-
ested, but positively unwilling to rule, because ruling 
would constitute an unwelcome distraction from their 
search for knowledge. Only if they feel compelled to rule 
by their own sense of justice, which tells them that they 
owe the city service in return for the education the city 
provided them that enabled them to become philosophers. 
But here’s the catch—or vicious circle. Philosophers 
won’t incur such an obligation for serving the city in re-
turn for the education they have received from it--unless 
their city is already ruled by philosophers. But philoso-
phers who were not themselves educated by the city 
would not want to rule—and non-philosophers wouldn’t 
understand the reasons why they should force the phi-
losophers to rule. Nor, in fact, could they. No one can 
force someone else to pay attention to a particular set of 
concerns. 
 So, where does Socrates—or Plato—leave us? By 
spelling out the requirements of establishing a just politi-
cal community, Socrates has both indicated what justice 
per se would require and why human beings are never apt 
to achieve it. 1) Socrates announced the first and most 
fundamental requirement of justice in his initial descrip-
tion of the “true” city: there must not be a conflict be-
tween the natural inclinations and good of the individuals 
who compose the city and the good of the community. 2) 
Unfortunately, as Glaucon’s protest against the “city of 
pigs” indicates, the natural inclinations, talents, and good 
of individual human beings are not as easily known, as 
Socrates seems to suggest.  Once their basic needs are sat-
isfied, human beings are easily led to imagine and wish 
for unnecessary luxuries, and to try to seize the goods of 
others unjustly in order to satisfy their new desires. 3) The 
unarmed, innocent inhabitants of cities thus require the 
protection of armed soldiers or policemen against unjust 
foreign aggressors and domestic criminals; and to prevent 
these armed guards from misusing their power, they must 
be persuaded not to fear death or to desire pleasure to ex-
cess. But, Socrates also admits, attempts to convince hu-
man beings not to fear death or desire pleasure won’t 
work. People will seek their own good at the expense of 
others unless they are subject to constant supervision. 
And who is to supervise the supervisors? Won’t the su-
pervisors or rulers use their power to seek their own 
good? Unless they are philosophers, who don’t seek to 
rule, because of their own peculiar nature and understand-
ing of the good, they will. 
 As Socrates indicates when he describes the degenera-
tion of the just city, the “aristocrats” who believe that they 
are better born or have “better blood,” than their fellow 
citizens are apt to use their arms to force the “lower born” 
to work for them. These “timocrats” thus accumulate pri-
vate property, even slaves, and try to perpetuate their 
bloodline by means of their own offspring.  (545c-547c) 
Children will not be reared, nurtured and educated in 
common; and, as a result, women will not be educated the 
same way as men. In other words, absent the rule of phi-
losophers, human beings develop the kinds of unjust re-
gimes we have seen in history.  Because they are not phi-
losophers, the so-called “aristocrats” do not understand 
what true human excellence is. Mistaking it for the honor 
granted by others or, more frequently, for wealth, “aris-
tocracies” degenerate into “oligarchies”; and the worship 
of wealth characteristic of oligarchies gradually produces 
a lack of restraint. People seek wealth in order to live as 
they please, and when they exhaust their own or their 
families’ resources, they seek control of the government 
to seize the resources of others. 
 What is at the bottom or the cause of this tendency for 
political communities to spiral downward into injustice, 
especially as they become wealthier and more powerful?  
The reason we see in reviewing Socrates’ account of the 
origin of both justice and injustice in the first “healthy” 
and then “feverish” cities-in-speech he describes is that in 
his first sketch of the “true” city he recognizes only the 
natural forces that work to bring human beings together 
for their mutual benefit—our lack of self-sufficiency as 
individuals and the advantages of an exchange of goods 
produced by a division of labor based on differences in 
natural talents and inclinations. What Socrates is only 
grudgingly and half-heartedly forced to admit in respond-
ing to the questions of his interlocutors is that this simple 
economic community constituted on the basis of wholly 
voluntary exchanges—the model still at the root of mod-
ern “market” economics—can be maintained only if peo-
ple limit their desires to what is necessary to live com-
fortably and at peace. But, as we have also been re-
minded, people are easily led to desire more than they 
need—and consequently to become unjust.  
 Socrates admits that his attempt to purge the citizens 
of his city-in-speech of all such desires won’t work, but 
he does not specify the reasons why.  He points—but only 
points—to the first reason when he asserts that it would 
be desirable for the city to become so unified that if any 
citizen feels pain, all do.  Socrates says that creating such 
a literally common feeling would be desirable, but he 
doesn’t claim that it is possible. He knows that, in fact, no 
human being can feel the pain of another; at most we can 
imagine and empathize with it.  And because we literally 
do not feel the pain of another, we do not care as much 
about that imagined pain as we would if we ourselves 
were suffering. In sum, as embodied beings, human be-
ings all exist separately from others.  The goods of the 
body can be distributed, but they can’t literally be shared.  
Only intellectual or purely intelligible goods can be 
shared with others without any loss.  There are, therefore, 
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fundamental natural limits to the extent to which human 
beings, even “friends” can hold all things in common. 
 Moreover, when the good in question is life or the 
preservation thereof, not merely of the individual, but of 
the community, Socrates’ attempt to unify the city by 
forcing its inhabitants to share everything comes into con-
flict with another very natural human characteristic.  
Young male human beings may become sexually aroused 
relatively easily, but they do not perform on command.  
Nor, because sexual desire in human beings is so closely 
tied to the imagination, are human beings indifferent to 
their partners.   It would be difficult to breed and raise 
human beings, as if we were dogs.  Socrates makes the 
radical proposals he does about the breeding and nurtur-
ing of citizens in common in order to provide females 
with the education they need in order to develop their in-
dividual natural talents. His proposals thus recognize and 
privilege one sort of natural difference—particularly in 
the intellectual abilities necessary to learn different skills 
or “arts”—at the expense of another, the obvious natural 
difference between members of the two sexes with regard 
to procreative functions.  
 Even if it were possible, as it may now seem to be, to 
overcome this natural difference by means of technology, 
Aristotle’s criticism of the communal institutions pro-
posed in Plato’s Republic would still hold. (Pol. 
2.1261a10-1264b15) When property or other things are 
held in common, Aristotle observes, no one in particular 
feels responsible for caring for them.  So, rather than eve-
ryone caring equally for everyone in the community--or 
feeling together--no one cares or feels anything much for 
anything or anybody else.  This phenomenon is now 
known as the “tragedy of the commons” in rational choice 
theory. And it has much more devastating effects with re-
gard to the care for people than for public resources or 
parks.  Public, government sponsored or required “care” 
for the elderly or young is notoriously cold, officious, bu-
reaucratic and unfeeling. The fact is that human beings 
care first and most about themselves, and, second, about 
those they hold particularly close to them, friends and 
family. As Aristotle sees it, this care about oneself and 
one’s family is the source and foundation of politics—
rather than the division of labor based on natural differ-
ences to which Socrates points.  (Pol. 1.1252a24-
1253a29) But whether it is the source or merely a serious 
complication, the attachment human beings feel to them-
selves and “their own” is the chief and enduring obstacle 
not only to the establishment of a completely just com-
munity but also to the establishment of a world commu-
nity encompassing all members of the human species or 
family.  This observation does not mean that there is noth-
ing human beings can do to make their political commu-
nities more just or caring.  Philosophers like Plato, Aris-
totle, and their many successors would not have asked 
what is just, if people did not want to know and to use 
their knowledge to improve their own lives and communi-
ties. Recognizing both the power and the importance of 
self-love and particularistic affection should, however, 
make us conscious of the limits of our power and hesitate 
to impose the same rules on everyone, everywhere for the 
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